Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1970

Phil L. Hansen v. Omar B. Bunnell; Samuel J. Taylor; Ray M.
Harding; And John E. Smith : Respondent's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Joseph P. McCarthy; Attorney for Respondents
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Hansen v. Bunnell, No. 11917 (1970).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5009

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In The Supreme
of the State of .
.;;

r

.
,

,

•··<-' ...
PHIL L. HANSEN, Attorney Genenl If ...:· .
Stat.a of Utah,
..
>..

Plaintiff and

...,,..

mittee,

BRIEF Of

MELVIN E. LESLIE
Allistant Att.omey General
118 Stat.a Capit.ol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
.:

'•

Attomey for Appellants

.' . '

1
.•

.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

NATURE OF THE CASE-----------------------------------------------···

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ..............................

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ····················-····--·-··----·
2
STATEMENT OF FACTS··-··-··---···---------------------------------- 2
ARGUMENT ------------·-----------------------------------------------------------

2

POINT I.

SECTION 2 OF SENATE BILL NO. 181
(CHAPTER 73, LAWS OF UTAH 1967)
WHICH BECAME CODIFIED AS UTAH CODE
ANN. 36-8-6 (1953), IS VOID AS BEING IN
CONTRAVENTION OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 7, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.....
A.

2

A LEGISLATOR APPOINTED TO THE JOINT
LEGAL SERVICES COMMITTEE, IS APPOINTED TO A "CIVIL 0 F FI CE OF
PROFIT". --------------------------------·-··················-------------- 3

B. THE EMOLUMENTS OF THE LEGISLATORS
WERE INCREASED WHEN THEY WERE
APPOINTED TO THIS COMMITTEE.............

4

POINT II.

SECTION 2 OF SENATE BILL NO. 181 CONTRAVENES SECTION 9 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION AS CONSTITUTING AN
INCREASE IN COMPENSATION BEYOND
THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT CONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWED. ------------------································
5

TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued
POIN III.

Page

THE PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE DOES NOT AFFECT THE INSTANT
SUIT. -----------------------------------------------------------------------CONCLUSION

8
9

CASES CITED
Burton v. State Appeal Board, 38 Wis. 2d 294, 156
N.W. 2d 386 (1968) ----------------------------------------------------

4

Foulger Equipment Company v. State Tax Commission,
16 Utah 2d 165, 397 P. 2d 298 (1964) --------------------

9

State ex rel. Barney v. Hawkins, 79 Mont. 506, 257
P. 411 (1927) ----------------------------------------------------------------

3

STATUTES CITED
Laws
Laws
Utah
Utah

of Utah 1961, S.J.R. No. 3 ---------------------------------------- 6
of Utah 1966, S.J.R. No. 4 ---------------------------------------- 6
Code Ann. Sec. 36-8-1 (1953) _______________________ _-__________ 4
Code Ann. Sec. 36-8-6 (1953) ____________________________________ !, 2
CONSTITUTIONS CITED

Constitution of Utah, Article VI, Section 7 -------------------- 3
Constitution of Utah, Article VI, Section 9 ________________ 5, 7, 8
OTHER AUTHORITY
Websters New International Dictionary, 2nd Edition ----

5

In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
PHIL L. HANSEN, Attorney General of the
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-v-

OMAR B. BUNNELL; SAMUEL J. TAYLOR; RAY M. HARDING; and JOHN E.
SMITH, individually and as members of
the Thirty-Seventh Utah State Legislature,
comprising the Joint Legal Services Committee,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
11917

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action that was brought by the Attorney General of the State of Utah, seeking to have
declared unconstitutional the provisions of Section
36-8-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953. This section provided that members of the Joint Legal Services Committee of the Utah State Legislature were to receive
a per diem payment of $25.00 per day and reimbursement for actual and necessary expenses incurred while attending meetings of that Committee.
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN
THE LOWER COURT
The lower court granted the respondent's motion for summary judgment, finding such payments
to the Joint Legal Services Committee unconstitutional.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks affirmation of the lower
court's decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts contained in the brief of
the appellant is accurate and a further statement will
not be made by respondent except as necessary in
presenting his argument.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTION 2 OF SENATE BILL NO. 181 (CHAPTER
73, LAWS OF UTAH 1967) WHICH BECAME CODIFIED
AS UTAH CODE ANN. § 36-8-6 (1953), IS VOID AS BE·
ING IN CONTRAVENTION OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION
7, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

Section 2 of Senate Bill No. 181 (Chapter 73,
Laws of Utah 1967), which became codified as Section 36-8-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, was enacted
by the 37th Legislature to read as follows:
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"Members of the committee shall be paid a
per diem of $25 per day and shall be reimbursed
for actual and necessary expenses incurred
while attending committee meetings."

At that time Article VI, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution read as follows:
"No member of the Legislature, during the
term for which he was elected, shall be appointed or elected to any civil office of profit
under this State, which shall have been created,
or the emoluments of which shall have been
increased, during the term for which he was
elected."

A. A LEGISLATOR, APPOINTED TO THE
JOINT LEGAL SERVICES COMMITTEE, IS APPOINTED TO A "CIVIL OFFICE OF PROFIT."

To be a "public office of a civil nature" there
are five elements which seem to be indispensable:
(1) The office must be created by the legislature or
state constitution; (2) it must possess a delegation of
a portion of the sovereign power of government, to
be exercised for the benefit of the public; (3) the
powers and duties must be defined by the legislature; (4) the duties must be performed independently and without control, unless otherwise specified
by the legislature; and (5) it must have some permanency and continuity. State ex rel. Barney v. Hawkins,
79 Mont. 506, 257 P.411 (1927).
The Joint Legal Services Committee should be
looked at to see if a member of this Committee pos-

4
sesses the requisites of a civil office of profit. The
Committee is established by Utah Code Ann.§ 36-8-1
(1953).
The appellants admit that the Committee was
created by the Utah State Legislature and that the
Committee's functions and duties are defined by
this Legislature. (Appellant's Brief at 7-8).
The Committee is given the duty of establishing an office of legal advisor to the legislature. This
legal advisor then has established rights and duties,
one of which is to give legal advice dealing with
any measure before the legislature. This Joint Legal
Services Committee does more than make available
new machinery and new methods by which legislators keep themselves informed, but get paid for
meeting as a Committee to select the legal advisor.
This Committee has the required independence
since no measures of control are set forth. They can
meet as often as they wish-drawing $25 each day
they meet.
Although it is possible to have the membership
of the Committee changed every two years, this
does not destroy the Committee's permanency and
continuity. The concept of the Joint Legal Services
Committee is not of transient nature. It is clear from
the plain meaning of the legislature enactment that
the law contemplates a permanently available Committee. See Burton v. State Appeal Board, 38 Wis. 2d 294,
156 N.W.2d 386 (1968).
B.

THE EMOLUMENTS OF THE LEGISLA-
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TORS WERE INCREASED WHEN THEY WERE APPOINTED TO THIS COMMITTEE.
A dictionary definition of emoluments is "profit
from office, employment or labor." Websters New
International Dictionary( 2nd Edition.
Section 2 of Senate Bill No. 181 gave the Committee members their actual and necessary expenses plus $25 per day while attending the Committee meetings. This was not an "across-the-board"
salary increase to all members of the legislature.
Since the Committee was created and the emoluments increased by the Legislature no legislator
should be allowed to claim any monies therefrom.
POINT II
SECTION 2 OF SENATE BILL 181 CONTRAVENES
SECTION 9 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AS CONSTITUTING AN INCREASE IN COMPENSATION BEYOND THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT CONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWED.

At the time Senate Bill 181 was passed by the
37th Legislature, Section 9 of Article VI of the Utah
Constitution read as follows:
"The members of the legislature shall receive such compensation, not exceeding $500.00
a year for the legislative term and $5.00 a day
expenses while actually in session, and mileage
as provided by law."
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This section limits the legislators to $500.00 a
year while actually in session. Section 2 of Senate
Bill 181 would have allowed the legislators to earn
$500.00 each month by merely attending 20 Committee meetings per month. The constitution limitation of $500.00 per year contemplated 60 days in
session each two years. If, as the other side argues,
the duties of the Committee members are merely
restatements of the duties of all legislators, then the
constitutional limitation of $500.00 should not be
expanded and enlarged for a certain elite body of
said legislators.
In view of the "legislative history" one can
easily see that the amount of $500.00 was meant to
be a limitation. The Laws of Utah, 1961, S.J.R. No. 3,
proposed increasing the compensation of legislators
to $1,200.00 a year and their expenses allowance to
$10.00 a day. The voters rejected this proposal.
The Laws of Utah 1966 (Second Special Ses·
sion), S.J.R. No. 4, indicated that the legislators proposed to increase their compensation to $1,000 a
year and to provide themselves with expenses and
mileage "as provided by law" both for attending
sessions and for attending meetings between sessions. Again the voter approval was not forthcoming.

Impatient with the democratic processes for
amending the Constitution of Utah and increasing
their compensation, defendants and their compatriots attempted through Section of Senate Bill 181
to provide by statute for the very "expenses and
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mileage for attending meetings between session
which the voters refused to allow them in 1966.
As originally drafted, Section 9 of Article VI of
the Utah Constitution provided as follows:
"The members of the Legislature shall receive such per diem and mileage as the Legislature may provide, not exceeding four dollars
per day, and ten cents per mile for the distance
necessarily traveled going to and returning from
the place of meeting on the most usual route,
and they shall receive no other pay or perquisite."

Note that the legislature was given the right to
provide for their per diem salary up to $4.00 per
day. Nothing beyond this was allowed. The phrase
"and they shall receive no other pay or perquisite"
adds nothing to that limitation.
Section 9 was amended in the general election
of 1944. The amended section, which became effective on January 1, 1945, then read as follows:
"The members of the Legislature shall receive such compensation and mileage as the
Legislature may provide, not exceeding $300.00
per year, and ten cents per mile for the distance
necessarily traveled going to and retW1rirtg
from the place of meeting on the most usual
route, and they shall receive no other pay or
perquisite."

Once again the legislature was given the right
to provide for its compensation, only this time up
to $300.00 per year. Again the phrase" ... and they
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shall receive no other pay or perquisite" adds nothing to the initial limitation.
The constitution was then amended in 1950, effective January 1, 1951, and this amendment was in
effect when Senate Bill 181 was passed by the legislature in 1967. Once again that section is cited and
the reader is asked to note that here the limitation
is set out point blank-the legislature is not given
an opportunity to set their own salary as they previously could:
"The members of the Legislature shall receive such compensation, not exceeding $500.00
a year for the legislative term and $5.00 a day
expenses while actually in session, and mileage
as provided by law." Constitution of Utah,
Article VI, Section 9.

The limitation is therefore more obvious than in the
previous sections which included the phrase "and
they shall receive no other pay or perquisite."
Our contention then is that the amendment
which dropped that phrase merely dropped sur·
pl usage.
POINT III
THE PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE
DOES NOT AFFECT THE INSTANT CASE.

Today, Section 9 of Art. VI of the Constitution of
Utah states:
"The members of the Legislature shall receive compensation pf $25 per diem while
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actually in session, and mileage as provided by
law."

This amended language should not affect the
case at bar. This case was originally filed on May
9, 1967, by the then Attorney General of the State
of Utah, Phil L. Hansen. If the court finds that Section
2of Senate Bill 181 was unconstitutional at the time
it was to become effective on May 9, 1967, then it
would be null and void ab initio and the later constitutional amendment of Section 9 of Article VI
would not resurrect Section 2 of Senate Bill 181 into
valid legislation.
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that it
will call an unconstitutional statute void ab initio
and any attempt to call it otherwise is "abortive and
unrealistic." Placing a constitutional change before
the electorate has never validated unconstitutional
legislation. Foulger Equipment Company v. State Tax Commission, 16 Utah 2d 165, 397 P.2d 298 (1964).
Therefore, this action is continuous and the
present langauge in the Utah Constitution in no
way affects this litigation.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the cases cited and the reasoning
herein, the respondent submits that the decision of
the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent

